Don't Lie to MeMichigan's 4th District, by the numbers
MI-4 Priorities · Entitlement Durability

Social Security and Medicare need maintenance, not applause

Both programs are headed toward a real, dated cliff. That makes every vote touching either of them a test of the same question: does this make the program more durable for the people who'll depend on it in fifteen years, or does it just feel good for the people voting on it right now? Huizenga has one clear vote in this space, and it's a genuinely mixed one.

Context: "insolvent" doesn't mean a trust fund vanishes to zero and pays nothing — by law, it means incoming payroll tax revenue can only cover a fraction of scheduled benefits, forcing an automatic cut unless Congress acts first. The dates below are the government's own projections for when that automatic cut would hit.

The clock, in the government's own words

2025 Trustees Report
Late 2032
Projected exhaustion date for Social Security's Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) trust fund, absent congressional action.
Source: Social Security and Medicare Trustees Report, 2025
2033
Projected exhaustion date for Medicare's Hospital Insurance (Part A) trust fund.
Source: Social Security and Medicare Trustees Report, 2025

The bigger picture: $40 trillion and counting

U.S. Treasury, CRFB
$40.1T
Total federal debt outstanding as of mid-September 2026. The government crossed $40 trillion for the first time on Aug. 18, 2026, and is already closing in on the $41.1T debt limit set by H.R. 1 last year.
Source: U.S. Treasury, Daily Treasury Statement
24%
Automatic, across-the-board cut to Social Security benefits that current law requires the moment the OASI trust fund runs dry in late 2032, unless Congress acts first.
Source: Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, analysis of Social Security Trustees data
12%
Automatic cut to Medicare hospital payments that hits when the HI trust fund runs dry in 2033, same mechanism.
Source: Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget

None of the serious options for heading that off are painless, and none of them are secret. On the Social Security side, the nonpartisan Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget has modeled the menu for years: raising the payroll tax rate by 4.6 percentage points would close the entire funding gap by itself; gradually raising the retirement age from 67 to 70 closes about a third of it; some combination of a higher payroll tax cap, slower benefit growth for higher earners, and a later retirement age closes the rest. Medicare's version of the same menu runs through higher payroll contributions, provider payment reform, and prescription-drug cost changes. Every one of those levers means someone pays more or gets less, starting now, so that someone else's benefit is still there in fifteen years. There is no version of "shoring up" these programs that doesn't cost real money or ask for real sacrifice today.

Set that against Huizenga's own record on the other side of the ledger. In 2017, representing the old MI-2 seat, he voted yes twice — on Nov. 16 and again on Dec. 20 — for the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, which CBO scored at roughly $2.3 trillion added to the deficit over ten years once debt-service costs are included. In 2025, representing MI-4, he voted yes twice more for H.R. 1, scored at $3.4 trillion over the next ten. Add those two votes together and it's something like $5.7 trillion in deficit-financed tax cuts across his career, cast with none of the offsetting revenue or spending cuts that would make the Social Security and Medicare math above any easier to solve. That's the real contrast: he is a lead sponsor of the one bill built to force Congress to confront this trade-off honestly, and a repeat "yes" vote on the kind of unpaid-for legislation that makes the trade-off harder. The Fiscal Commission Act is effort. It has produced zero results — no markup, no floor vote, nothing — across two separate Congresses. Both things belong on the same page, because they're both his record.

The one clear vote: popular, unpaid-for, and real

House Clerk record

On Nov. 12, 2024, Huizenga voted yes on the Social Security Fairness Act (H.R. 82), which passed 327–75 and repealed two provisions — the Windfall Elimination Provision and the Government Pension Offset — that had reduced Social Security benefits for roughly 2.4 million people with public-sector pensions, including many teachers, firefighters, and police officers. It is genuinely popular, and the fairness argument behind it is genuinely real: people who paid into these systems felt penalized for it.

It's also, by CBO's own numbers, exactly the kind of vote this section is built to flag. The repeal wasn't offset with any other savings. CBO scored it at $196 billion in added outlays through 2034, roughly $233 billion including interest, and the Social Security Administration's own Chief Actuary said the change moved up the combined trust funds' insolvency date by about six months. A member can vote for this bill in good conscience — it corrected a genuine unfairness — while the vote itself still shortens the runway before automatic benefit cuts hit everyone on Social Security, not just the retirees it helped. Both things are true at once, and neither cancels the other out.

What's not measured yet: any standalone Huizenga vote or bill directly restructuring Social Security or Medicare benefits, financing, or eligibility — as opposed to the one expansion vote covered here. If one exists, it hasn't surfaced in this research yet. See Methodology for the sourcing rules, or the Priorities index for the rest of this section.