Does he exercise the powers only Congress has?

Tariffs, emergencies, war powers, spending, and oversight are policy questions, and they're also questions about who gets to decide. Presidents have gained substantial authority in each of these areas, partly because Congress has delegated powers by statute and partly because Congress has at times declined to challenge executive action. Congressional power a member hands to a president of one party doesn't disappear when the other party takes the White House. That's why congressional responsibility is one of the four questions in this site's Four-Part Test. With public accountability, it makes up the institutional-performance half; district relevance and long-term durability make up the representation half.

Article I, Section 8 gives Congress the power to "lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises," to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations," to "declare War," and to "raise and support Armies" (Constitution Annotated, Art. I, §8). Article I, Section 9 provides that "No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law" (Art. I, §9, cl. 7). Article II makes the president commander in chief. The boundaries aren't always simple, and the table below keeps three things apart: what the constitutional text says, what Congress has delegated by statute, and what the executive branch claims.

Trade and emergency powers

This part matters especially for Michigan, whose largest foreign market is Canada (see Alliances & Trade).

On Feb. 1, 2025, the President signed Executive Order 14193. It expanded the national emergency declared Jan. 20, 2025 for the southern border to cover fentanyl and the northern border, stating "I hereby declare and reiterate a national emergency under the NEA and IEEPA." It imposed an additional 25% duty on most Canadian goods and 10% on Canadian energy and energy resources (White House text). Separate orders the same day covered Mexico and China. The Trade & Manufacturing piece follows the tariffs from there, including USMCA exemptions and the later Section 122, 301, and 338 actions.

The policy question is whether those tariffs were useful. The congressional-responsibility question is different: should a president be able to impose broad tariffs through emergency economic authority without Congress affirmatively approving them? The House had two kinds of votes on that question.

• Votes on whether the House would vote at all. Four 2025 House rules switched off the NEA's expedited procedure for ending the tariff emergencies: H.Res. 211 (Mar. 11, 2025, passed 216–214), H.Res. 313 (Apr. 9, 216–215), H.Res. 354 (Apr. 29, 216–208), and H.Res. 707 (Sept. 16, 213–211). Huizenga voted yes on each. He also voted on Sept. 15, 2025 to table an attempt to force a vote on the Brazil tariff emergency (Roll 265, tabled 200–198), and on Feb. 10, 2026 for a rule, H.Res. 1042, that failed 214–217 (Roll 60). Each of these rules also set terms of debate for unrelated bills, so a yes vote wasn't only a vote on the emergency provision.
• The vote on the emergency itself. On Feb. 11, 2026, the House passed H.J.Res. 72, which would terminate "the national emergency declared by the finding of the President on February 1, 2025, in Executive Order 14193." It passed 219–211, with 6 Republicans and 213 Democrats voting yes and 210 Republicans and 1 Democrat voting no. Huizenga voted no (Roll 65). The Senate received it on Feb. 12, 2026 and referred it to the Finance Committee, and there's been no further action (bill status). It has passed the House only.

Nine days after the House vote, the Supreme Court held that IEEPA doesn't authorize tariffs, which ended the IEEPA tariffs through the courts rather than through Congress. When the replacement Section 122 tariff reached its 150-day statutory limit in July 2026, Congress didn't vote to extend it (details).

I haven't found a statement from Huizenga explaining these votes. For context, in May 2018 he publicly opposed the first Trump administration's Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs on allies, saying imports from those countries "do not pose a security risk to the United States."

The no vote on H.J.Res. 72 doesn't establish that Huizenga thinks Congress has no role in trade. Congress wrote the statutes presidents use, and a member can reasonably conclude that a particular action falls within authority Congress already granted. On the facts, though, he had a direct opportunity to end the emergency behind tariffs on Michigan's largest trading partner, and he voted to leave it in place. He also voted for each 2025 rule that kept the House from reaching that vote sooner.

War powers

The test here isn't whether a member supports or opposes military action against Iran. It's this: when hostilities occur without a new congressional authorization, does the member insist that Congress make the decision?

According to the administration, U.S. hostilities with Iran began Feb. 28, 2026. It also says they "terminated with the ceasefire ordered by the President on April 7, 2026," and that the two countries signed a memorandum of understanding on June 17, 2026 (OMB statement, June 23, 2026). Sponsors of the later resolutions disputed that hostilities had ended. That disagreement matters for how to read the votes after April. The House voted six times on resolutions directing the removal of U.S. forces from hostilities with Iran, and Huizenga voted no each time.

Three of the six were adopted by the House. The 2026 Lebanon resolutions, which he also opposed, are listed with the rest of the war-powers votes in the Voting Record.

What the passed resolutions did is itself disputed. A concurrent resolution isn't presented to the president. Section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution says forces "shall be removed" if Congress so directs by concurrent resolution. The administration's position is that such resolutions "lack the force of law and should be deemed unconstitutional legislative vetoes" under INS v. Chadha, and that there were "no present hostilities from which to remove U.S. Armed Forces" by June (OMB, June 23, 2026). This page doesn't resolve that dispute. H.Con.Res. 86 is the only one of the six adopted by both chambers.

He explained his position on the House floor during debate on the first resolution, H.Con.Res. 38, on Mar. 4, 2026 (Congressional Record, H2403–H2404). Addressing a Republican colleague from Ohio who supported the resolution, he said, "We have a different opinion on whether this is legal or not." He cited Iran's decades of attacks through proxy forces, its missile and drone production, and what he called the regime's assassination attempt against the President. He argued that "peace through strength does not mean another open-ended war of the past" and called the operation "a defensive action." On Congress's role, he said the administration "has clearly defined the mission, the objective, and the timeline" and "has notified and briefed Congress on these operations." Notification is what the War Powers Resolution's reporting provision (section 4) requires. The resolution under debate asked a different question: whether Congress must also authorize the hostilities. His remarks suggest he viewed the operation as lawful without a new authorization, which is the executive branch's position in the dispute described above.

On June 3, 2026, the day of the H.Con.Res. 86 vote, Huizenga discussed the resolution on Fox & Friends First. According to the network's summary (secondary source), he called it a "political game" and defended the President's ability to negotiate, and he identified Iran's Revolutionary Guard as responsible for ceasefire violations (Fox clip). During the June 2025 Israel-Iran conflict, before the 2026 hostilities, his newsletter said the U.S. "needs to protect American troops, our allies, and our interests," endorsed "measured steps as President Trump has done," and added: "We should not have American engagement on the ground" (Huizenga Huddle, June 17, 2025). The executive branch's legal position, set out above, gives a member who shares it a legal rationale for voting no.

Since 2019, his record on war-powers resolutions has run in one direction. Under President Biden, Huizenga voted no on H.Con.Res. 21 (Syria, Mar. 8, 2023, failed 103–321) and H.Con.Res. 30 (Somalia, Apr. 27, 2023, failed 102–321). Under the current administration he voted no on the December 2025 resolutions on Venezuela and on designated terrorist organizations in the Western Hemisphere (Roll 346, failed 211–213; Roll 345, failed 210–216). In the President's first term, he voted no on the Yemen resolutions of 2019 (H.J.Res. 37, passed 248–177; S.J.Res. 7, passed 247–175) and on the January and March 2020 Iran resolutions (H.Con.Res. 83, agreed to 224–194; S.J.Res. 68, passed 227–186). The 2023 resolutions concerned long-running deployments and failed by wide bipartisan margins, while the 2026 Iran votes concerned newly begun hostilities and were decided by a few votes.

Under President Obama, representing the old MI-2 district, his votes went the other way on the one case most like Iran in 2026. In March 2011 the U.S. joined air operations in Libya without congressional authorization. On June 3, 2011, Huizenga voted yes on H.Con.Res. 51, a section 5(c) resolution directing removal of U.S. forces from Libya within 15 days (text). It failed 148–265, and he was one of 87 Republicans voting yes, while 144 voted no. On June 24, 2011, he voted no on authorizing the Libya mission (H.J.Res. 68, failed 123–295). He voted yes on limiting Defense Department funds for it (H.R. 2278, failed 180–238). The executive-branch argument then parallels the one now. The State Department's legal adviser told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the Libya operation "has not constituted the kind of 'hostilities' envisioned by the War Powers Resolution's 60-day pullout rule" (hearing transcript, June 28, 2011). In July 2014 he also voted for H.Con.Res. 105, which barred a "sustained combat role in Iraq without specific statutory authorization" (passed 370–40). His Obama-era record wasn't uniform. He voted no on removal resolutions for Afghanistan (2011) and for Iraq and Syria (2015), and against the 2014 amendment authorizing training and equipping of Syrian rebels (Roll 507, adopted 273–156). I haven't found a statement from him explaining the Libya votes.

Executive oversight

Any fair evaluation has to count an area where Huizenga has actively asserted congressional authority. In January 2023, with Biden in the White House, he became chairman of the Financial Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, which oversees the SEC, the Federal Reserve, Treasury, the CFPB, and other agencies in the committee's jurisdiction. He said then that he looked "forward to leading the fight against this Administration's repeated attempts to ignore Congressional oversight" (Jan. 12, 2023). His documented oversight activity includes:

• Silicon Valley Bank (March 2023). He questioned the Federal Reserve's vice chair for supervision, the FDIC chairman, and Treasury's under secretary for domestic finance after the bank's collapse. He pressed for release of confidential supervisory information to the committee and to GAO and asked when FSOC meeting minutes would be released (Mar. 29, 2023). In May 2023 his subcommittee held a hearing on GAO's preliminary review of the SVB and Signature Bank failures (Congress.gov).
• SEC document requests (April–May 2023). He pressed SEC Chair Gary Gensler over the agency's response to requests for records on the proposed climate-disclosure rule and on the FTX charges. He called the response, which consisted largely of public material, "insufficient and unacceptable" (Apr. 18, 2023). He and Chairman Patrick McHenry then set a deadline for production and warned of committee action (May 10, 2023).
• CFIUS (September 2023). At a full-committee hearing, not his own subcommittee, he questioned Treasury's assistant secretary for investment security about CFIUS's handling of Gotion Inc.'s proposed battery plants near Big Rapids, Mich., in light of the Chinese parent company's ties to the Chinese Communist Party (Sept. 13, 2023).
• Contempt of Congress (June 2024). He voted to hold Attorney General Merrick Garland in contempt for not producing audio of President Biden's interview with Special Counsel Robert Hur (H.Res. 1292, Roll 260, June 12, 2024, passed 216–207). Explaining the vote, he wrote: "Congress has the constitutional responsibility and authority to conduct oversight of the Executive Branch" (June 20, 2024).

That record counts. Demanding documents, questioning regulators, and investigating agency decisions are central congressional functions. His oversight record under Presidents Obama and Trump's first term is in The earlier record below.

In the current Congress, Huizenga is vice chairman of the Financial Services Committee and chairman of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on South and Central Asia (his office, Jan. 13, 2025). He also sits on the Financial Institutions and Digital Assets subcommittees and the Foreign Affairs Africa subcommittee (House Clerk member data, Sept. 2, 2026). Chairing a subcommittee with jurisdiction over State Department policy in the region gives him a current oversight platform over this administration. For example, on Feb. 11, 2026 he chaired a hearing on U.S. policy in South Asia with a State Department assistant secretary testifying. His opening remarks credited the President with having "brokered a historic trade deal with India" (committee release). This review covered his published remarks, not the full hearing transcripts or his questioning of witnesses.

On the administration's government-efficiency effort, his Feb. 7, 2025 newsletter said the President "used his authority to rename and reorganize" the U.S. Digital Service as DOGE. It relayed Treasury's assurance, given "in response to congressional concerns," that its payment-system review wasn't stopping or rerouting payments, and added: "I agree that DOGE must abide by President Trump's executive order to work within the law and adhere to rigorous data protection standards" (Huizenga Huddle, Feb. 7, 2025).

I haven't found a subpoena, formal document demand, or contempt effort by Huizenga directed at the current administration. That is an absence of evidence, not evidence that no such activity exists, and his current gavels cover different agencies than his 118th Congress chairmanship did.

Appropriations

Two questions are easy to blur here. The first is ordinary fiscal policy: how much Congress should spend, tax, or borrow, which the Fiscal Responsibility piece covers. The second is constitutional: after Congress appropriates money, can a president decline to spend it, freeze it, redirect it, or change the program Congress enacted without returning to Congress? A full assessment has to separate executive actions a statute expressly permits, ordinary administrative discretion, rescissions Congress approves, and unilateral withholding or redirection of appropriated funds.

One documented data point falls in the third category. Huizenga voted for the Rescissions Act of 2025 (H.R. 4), which canceled about $9 billion of the $9.4 billion the President proposed under the Impoundment Control Act. He voted for it on House passage (Roll 168, June 12, 2025, 214–212) and on H.Res. 590 (Roll 203, July 18, 2025, 216–213), a rule whose adoption also agreed to the Senate version, so it was the House's final vote on the bill. It became Public Law 119-28 on July 24, 2025 (bill status). That was the Act's process working as written: Congress, not the President, decided to cancel the money. It shows he supported those cuts. It doesn't show his position on spending changes made without a vote.

The contested cases are different. On Aug. 28, 2025, the White House sent a special message proposing to rescind nearly $5 billion in foreign aid late enough in the fiscal year that the funds would expire before Congress's 45-day window closed, a "pocket rescission." GAO says that isn't lawful, OMB says it is, and no court has decided the merits (CRS, LSB11374).

His earlier record gives context but doesn't settle the current question (details in The earlier record below). Under President Obama, he voted to authorize the House lawsuit that became House v. Burwell, in which a federal court held that paying certain health-insurance reimbursements "without an appropriation thus violates the Constitution." In the President's first term, he voted three times against ending the 2019 border emergency, which the administration used to shift up to $3.6 billion in military construction funds to barrier construction. The two cases aren't mirror images. Burwell involved spending with no appropriation. The 2019 transfers relied on statutory authorities, 10 U.S.C. 2808 and 284, whose use for this purpose was contested in court.

For the 2025–26 disputes, the evidence reviewed so far is insufficient for a broad conclusion about Huizenga's record on impoundment and executive alteration of appropriations. I haven't found a vote, statement, letter, or hearing in which he addressed the pocket rescission, the January 2025 OMB funding-pause memo, or other withholding or redirection of appropriated funds. That absence is not evidence of support or of opposition. This remains an open item for this project.

The earlier record: MI-2, 2011–2020

From 2011 through 2022, Huizenga represented the old 2nd District, which had different lines from today's MI-4. His votes there aren't part of this site's Voting Record tables, which begin in 2023. They're included on this page because the test asks whether his standard holds across administrations. The Obama years add a second Democratic presidency to the comparison, and the President's first term adds a second Republican one. Every vote below was checked against the House Clerk's record. One caution applies throughout: whichever party held the House chose which of these measures reached the floor, and most of them passed or failed on near party-line votes.

On President Obama's November 2014 immigration order, Huizenga told the Ludington Daily News, in excerpts his office republished: "The president is trying to go forward without any kind of legislative process" (Nov. 24, 2014). He also wrote his own oversight legislation. As chairman of the Financial Services Subcommittee on Monetary Policy and Trade in the 114th Congress (his office), he sponsored the Fed Oversight Reform and Modernization Act (H.R. 3189). Among other things, it would have required the Federal Reserve to adopt and report a monetary policy rule, and its chair to testify quarterly. It passed the House 241–185 (Roll 641, Nov. 19, 2015) and wasn't enacted.

The 2018 vote is evidence in his favor under this test: it demanded that an administration of his own party comply with a congressional subpoena. The 2019 votes point the other way. They opposed Democratic-majority efforts to enforce subpoenas and hold officials of the same administration in contempt.

• Libya funding, 2011. He voted yes on H.R. 2278, which would have limited Defense Department funds for the Libya operation (failed 180–238). That was a use of the purse to constrain a military action.
• Expedited rescissions, 2012. He voted yes on the Expedited Legislative Line-Item Veto and Rescissions Act (H.R. 3521, passed 254–173; not enacted). It would have let President Obama propose rescissions of newly enacted funding, while still requiring a vote in Congress to cancel them (text). That's the same structure as the 2025 Rescissions Act he supported, so on this point his record is consistent across parties.
• House v. Burwell, 2014–2016. The lawsuit authorized by H.Res. 676, which he voted for, challenged cost-sharing reimbursements the Obama administration paid to insurers. On May 12, 2016, the U.S. District Court for D.C. held that Congress "authorized reduced cost sharing but did not appropriate monies for it." It ruled that paying the reimbursements "without an appropriation thus violates the Constitution." It enjoined further payments but stayed the injunction pending appeal (opinion).
• The 2019 border emergency. On Feb. 15, 2019, the President declared a national emergency at the southern border. The administration said it would use the declaration to move up to $3.6 billion from military construction projects under 10 U.S.C. 2808, alongside other transfers, toward barrier construction (White House fact sheet; CRS R45937). Huizenga voted against ending the emergency three times. The first was H.J.Res. 46 (Feb. 26, 2019, passed 245–182, vetoed Mar. 15). The second was the veto override (Mar. 26, failed 248–181). The third was S.J.Res. 54 (Sept. 27, passed 236–174, vetoed Oct. 15, and the Senate override failed). I haven't found a statement from him on these votes.

• Trade authority for a Democratic president. In June 2015 he voted to give President Obama trade promotion ("fast-track") authority (June 12, 219–211; June 18, 218–208; enacted as Public Law 114-26). Under that law Congress sets negotiating objectives and keeps an up-or-down vote on any agreement. He also voted for Trade Adjustment Assistance, one of 86 Republicans to do so, but that measure failed 126–302 (Roll 361). This is consistent with the view that Congress can properly delegate trade authority to presidents of either party. That view is also one of the readings of his 2025–26 tariff votes.
• Review of the Iran nuclear agreement, 2015. He voted for the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act, which gave Congress a review period over any agreement (Roll 226, 400–25; enacted as Public Law 114-17). In September 2015 he voted for H.Res. 411, finding that President Obama hadn't complied with that Act. He also voted for H.R. 3460, which would have suspended the president's statutory authority to waive Iran sanctions, and against approving the agreement (H.R. 3461). His office's statement on the agreement stressed its substance, not process (July 14, 2015). I haven't found a comparable vote to reclaim delegated authority under a Republican president.
• Congressional approval of major regulations. He voted for the REINS Act, which would require Congress to approve major agency rules, in 2013, 2015, and on Jan. 5, 2017, after the President's first election and before his inauguration. He also voted for the Separation of Powers Restoration Act (2016), which would have ended judicial deference to agency legal interpretations. His support for REINS carried into a Republican administration, which is consistent across parties.
• Emergencies under President Obama. I found no House vote in 2011–2016 on ending a national emergency, so there's no Obama-era baseline for the emergency votes.

Across administrations

• Votes to terminate or sustain presidential national-emergency declarations, and rules that decide whether those votes happen.
• Legislation restoring congressional tariff authority or delegating more of it.
• War-powers resolutions and authorizations for use of military force.
• Congressional responses to executive withholding, rescission, transfer, or redirection of appropriated funds.
• Huizenga's oversight activity involving the current administration, including in his South and Central Asia subcommittee: subpoenas, document requests, hearings, and public statements asserting congressional authority.
• Whether he applies substantially similar institutional standards across administrations of different parties.
• Executive use of Medicare and Medicaid funding and participation rules to restrict particular medical treatments, and his response to it. The Healthcare & Coverage piece covers the 2025–2026 CMS rules and his 2021 opposition to a CMS vaccination requirement as "executive overreach."

The purpose isn't to count disagreements with a president. It's to see whether Congress's constitutional role stays a priority when defending it carries a political cost.